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Abstract
We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical
goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural no-
overbidding assumption: the buyers do not bid above their incremental values. Structurally, we
show equilibria are intrinsically linked to a greedy bidding strategy. We then prove three results.
First, any equilibrium consists of three phases: a competitive phase, a competition reduction
phase and a monopsony phase. In particular, there is a time after which one buyer exhibits
monopsonistic behaviours. Second, the declining price anomaly holds: prices weakly decrease
over time at any equilibrium in the no-overbidding game, a fact previously known for equilibria
with overbidding. Third, the price of anarchy of the sequential auction is exactly 1− 1/e.
1 Introduction
In a two-buyer multiunit sequential auction a collection of T identical items are sold one after
another. This is done using a single-item second-price (or first-price) auction in each time period.
Due to their temporal nature, equilibria in sequential auctions are extremely complex and somewhat
misunderstood objects [8, 12, 13]. This paper aims to provide a framework in which to understand
two-buyer sequential auctions. Specifically, we study equilibria in the auction setting where both
duopsonists have non-decreasing incremental valuation functions under the natural assumption
of no-overbidding. Our main technical contribution is an in-depth analysis of the relationship
between equilibrium bidding strategies and a greedy behavioural strategy. This similitude allows
us to provide a characterization of equilibria with no-overbidding and to prove three results.
One, any equilibrium in a two-buyer sequential auction with no-overbidding induces three
phases: a competitive phase, a competition reduction phase and a monopsony phase. In par-
ticular, there is a time after which one of the two duopsonists will behave as a monoposonist. Here
monopsonistic behaviour refers to the type of strategies expected from a buyer with the ability to
clinch the entire market. Intriguingly, we show that this fact does not hold for equilibria where
overbidding is permitted.
Two, the declining price anomaly holds for two-buyer sequential auctions with no-overbidding;
the price weakly decreases over time for any equilibrium in the auction. This result shows that the
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seminal result of Gale and Stegeman [8], showing the declining price anomaly holds for equilibria
in two-buyer sequential auctions with overbidding permitted, carries over to equilibria in auctions
with no-overbidding. Notably, this declining price anomaly can fail to hold for three or more buyers,
even with no-overbidding [13].
Three, the price of anarchy in two-buyer sequential auctions with no-overbidding is exactly
1 − 1e ≃ 0.632. We remark that the same bound has been claimed in [3, 4] for equilibria where
overbidding is allowed but, unfortunately, there is a flaw in their arguments (see Section 6.1).
1.1 Related Work
The complete information model of two-buyer sequential auctions studied in this paper was intro-
duced by Gale and Stegeman [8]. This was extended to multi-buyer sequential auctions by Paes
Leme et al. [12] (see also [13]). Rodriguez [14] studied equilibria in the special case of identical
items and identical buyers with endowments.
Ashenfelter [1] observed that the price of identical lots fell over time at a sequential auction for
wine. This tendency for a decreasing price trajectory is known as the declining price anomaly [10].
Many attempts have been made to explain this anomaly and there is now also a plethora of empirical
evidence showing its existence in practice; see [2, 15, 13] and the references within for more details.
On the theoretical side, given complete information, Gale and Stegeman [8] proved that a weakly
decreasing price trajectory is guaranteed in a two-buyer sequential auction for identical items.
Prebet et al. [13] recently proved that declining prices are not assured in sequential multiunit
auctions with three or more buyers, but gave experimental evidence to show that counter-examples
to the anomaly appear extremely rare.
In the computer science community research has focussed on the welfare of equilibria in se-
quential auctions. Bae et al. [3, 4] study the price of anarchy in two-buyer sequential auctions for
identical items. There has also been a series of works bounding the price of anarchy in multi-buyer
sequential auctions for non-identical goods; see, for example, [12, 16, 6].
Sequential auctions with incomplete information have also been studied extensively since the
classical work of Milgrom and Weber [11, 17]. We remark that to study the temporal aspects of
the auction independent of informational aspects it is natural to consider the case of complete
information. Indeed, our work is motivated by the fact that, even in the basic setting of complete
information, the simplest case of two-buyers is not well understood.
1.2 Overview of the Paper
Section 2 presents the model of two-buyer sequential auctions with complete information. It also
includes a collection of examples that illustrate some of the difficulties that arise in understanding
sequential auctions and provide the reader with a light introduction to some of the technical concepts
that will play a role in the subsequent analyses of equilibria. They will also motivate the importance
and relevance of no-overbidding. This section concludes by incorporating tie-breaking rules in
winner determination. Section 3 provides a measure for the power of a duopsonist and presents a
natural greedy bidding strategy that a buyer with duopsony power may apply. Section 4 studies
how prices and duopsony power evolve over time when the buyers apply the greedy bidding strategy.
The relevance of greedy bidding strategies is exhibited in Section 5 where we explain their close
relationship with equilibria bidding strategies. This relationship allows us to provide a character-
ization of equilibria with no-overbidding. Key features of equilibria follow from these structural
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results. First, any equilibria induces three distinct phases with a time after which some buyer
behaves as a monopsonist. Second, prices weakly decrease over time for any equilibrium. Finally,
in Section 6 we prove the price of anarchy is exactly 1− 1e .
2 Two-Buyer Sequential Auctions
In this section we introduce two-buyer sequential auctions and illustrate their strategic aspects via
a set of simple examples. There are T items to be sold, one per time period by a second-price
auction.1 Buyer i ∈ {1, 2} has a value Vi(k) for obtaining exactly k items and incremental value
vi(k) = Vi(k)−Vi(k−1) for gaining a kth item. We assume Vi(·) is normalised at zero and concave.
Example 1: Consider a two-buyer auction with two items, where the incremental valuations are
(v1(1), v1(2)) = (10, 9) and (v2(1), v2(2)) = (8, 5). The outcome that maximizes social welfare is for
buyer 1 to receive both copies of the item. However, at equilibrium, buyer 2 wins the first item at
a price of 6, and buyer 1 wins the second item at a price of 5. To see this, imagine that buyer 1
wins in the first period. Then in the second period she will have to pay 8 to beat buyer 2. Given
this, buyer 2 will be willing to pay up to 8 to win in the first round. Thus, buyer 1 will win both
permits for 8 each and obtain a utility (profit) of (10 + 9)− 2 · 8 = 3. Suppose instead that buyer 2
wins in the first round. Now in the second period, buyer 1 will only need to pay 5 to beat buyer 2,
yielding a profit of 10− 5 = 5. So, by bidding 6 in the first period, buyer 1 can guarantee herself a
profit of 5. Given this bid, buyer 2 will maximize his own utility by winning the first permit for 6.
Note that this outcome, the only rational solution, proffers suboptimal welfare.
2.1 An Extensive-Form Game
We compactly model this sequential auction as an extensive-form game with complete information
using a directed graph. The node set is given H = {(x1, x2) ∈ Z+|x1 + x2 ≤ T}. Each node has a
label x = (x1, x2) denoting how many items each buyer has currently won. There is a source node,
0 = (0, 0), corresponding to the initial round of the auction, and terminal nodes (x1, x2), where
x1 + x2 = T . If x is a terminal node, we write x ∈ H0, otherwise we say that x is a decision node
and write x ∈ H+. We also denote by t(y) = T − y1− y2 the number of items remaining to be sold
at node y; when the decision node is actually denoted x, we simply write t for t(x).
We also extend our notation for incremental valuations. Specifically, we denote the incremental
value of buyer i of a kth additional item given endowment x (i.e. from decision node x) as vi(k|x) =
Vi(xi + k) − Vi(xi + k − 1), for k ∈ N. For valuations at the source node, we drop the explicit
notation of the decision node: for example, vi(k) = vi(k|0).
We find an equilibrium by calculating the forward utility of each buyer at every node. The
forward utility is the profit a buyer will earn from that period in the auction onwards. There is no
future profit at the end of the auction, so the forward utility of each buyer is zero at each terminal
node. The forward utilities at decision nodes are then obtained by backwards induction on t: each
decision node x has a left child x+ e1 and a right child x+ e2, respectively corresponding to buyer
1 and 2 winning an item. For the case of second-price auctions, it is a weakly dominant strategy
for each buyer to bid its marginal value for winning. This bid value is the incremental value plus
1We present our results for second-price auctions. Given an appropriate formulation of the bidding space to ensure
the existence of an equilibrium [12] these results also extend to the case of first-price auctions.
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the forward utility of winning minus the forward utility of losing. Thus, at the node x, the bids of
each buyer are
b1(x) = v1(1|x) + u1(x+ e1)− u1(x+ e2),
b2(x) = v2(1|x) + u2(x+ e2)− u2(x+ e1).
If b1(x) ≥ b2(x) then buyer 1 will win and the forward utilities at x are then
u1(x) = v1(1|x) + u1(x+ e1)− b2(x+ e2)
= (v1(1|x) − v2(1|x)) + u1(x+ e1)− u2(x+ e2) + u2(x+ e1),
u2(x) = u2(x+ e1).
The forward utilities are defined symmetrically if b1(x) ≤ b2(x) and buyer 2 wins. Given the forward
utilities at every node, the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies then produces a
unique equilibrium [8, 3].
The auction of Example 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The first row in each node contains its
label x = (x1, x2) and also the number of items, t = T − x1 − x2, remaining to be sold. The
second row shows the forward utility of each buyer. Arcs are labelled by the bid value; here arcs
for buyer 1 point left and arcs for buyer 2 point right. Solid arcs represent winning bids and dotted
arcs represent losing bids. The equilibrium path, in bold, verifies our previous argument: buyer 2
wins the first item at price 6 and buyer 1 wins the second item at price 5.
(0,0)–2
5 : 2
(1,0)–1
1 : 0
(0,1)–1
5 : 0
(2,0)–0
0 : 0
(1,1)–0
0 : 0
(0,2)–0
0 : 0
6 8
9 8 10 5
Figure 1: The extensive form for Example 1. The set of histories has the structure of a rooted tree.
Iteratively solving for an equilibrium gives the auction tree, with bidding strategies and forward
utilities shown.
Consequently, in a two-buyer sequential auction, each subgame corresponds to a standard
second-price auction. We remark that for sequential auctions with three or more buyers each
subtree in the extensive-form game corresponds to an auction with interdependent valuations (or
an auction with externalities) [7, 9]. As a result, equilibria in such multi-buyer sequential auctions
are even more complex than for two buyers; see [12, 13] for details.
2.2 No-Overbidding
Unfortunately, equilibria in sequential auctions can have undesirable and unrealistic properties. In
particular they may exhibit severe overbidding.
Example 2: Consider a sequential auction with T items for sale and incremental valuations shown
in Figure 2, where 0 < ǫ ≪ 1/T 2. The key observation here is that if buyer 1 wins her first item
before the final period she will then win in every subsequent period for a price 1− ǫ. On the other
4
Incremental Values vi(1) vi(2) . . . vi(T − 1) vi(T )
Buyer 1 1 1 . . . 1 1
Buyer 2 1− ǫ 1− ǫ . . . 1− ǫ 0
Figure 2: Incremental values of each buyer which induce “severe” overbidding.
hand, if buyer 1 wins her first item in the final period then the price will be 0. This is because
buyer 2 must then have won the first T −1 items and so has no value for winning in the final round.
These observations imply that buyer 1 will bid b1(t) = (T − t) · ǫ in period t. At equilibrium,
buyer 2 will beat these bids in the first T−1 periods and make a profit of (1−ǫ)·(T−1)−12 (T−1)T ·ǫ =
Ω(T ). But if buyer 2 loses the first item, he will win no items at all in the auction and thus his
forward utility from losing is zero. Consequently, his marginal value for winning the first period is
Ω(T ) and so he will bid b2(1) = Ω(T ) ≫ 1 − ǫ. Thus, at the equilibrium, buyer 2 will massively
overbid in nearly every round.
Overbidding in a sequential auction is very risky and depends crucially on perfect information,
so it is rare in practice. To understand some of these risks consider again Example 2. Equilibria
are very sensitive to the valuation functions and any uncertainty concerning the payoff valuations
could lead to major changes in the outcome. For instance, suppose buyer 1 is mistaken in her belief
regarding the T th incremental value of buyer 2. Then she will be unwilling to let buyer 2 win
the earlier items at a low price. Consequently, if buyer 2 bids b2(1) = Ω(T ) then he will make a
loss, and continuing to follow the equilibrium strategy will result in a huge loss. This is important
even with complete information because, for computational or behavioral reasons, a buyer cannot
necessarily assume with certainty that the other buyer will follow the equilibrium prescription; for
example, the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games is hard. Likewise in competitive
settings with externalities, where the a buyer may have an interest in limiting the profitability of
its competitor, overbidding is an unappealing option. We address this wedge between theory and
practice by imposing a non-overbidding assumption, and indeed such assumptions are common in
the theoretical literature [16, 5]. We leave the analysis of models that explicitly capture the risks
described above as a direction for future research.
For our sequential auctions, given its valuation function, each buyer will naturally constrain its
bid by its incremental value. So we will assume this no-(incremental) overbidding property:
bi(x) ≤ vi(1|x) (1)
In particular, at each stage a buyer will bid the minimum of its incremental value and its marginal
value for winning.
We note that the no-overbidding property is especially well-suited to our setting of valua-
tions that exhibit decreasing marginal values and free disposal. That is, valuations that are non-
decreasing and weakly concave. Without these assumptions, sequential auctions can exhibit severe
exposure problems2 that introduce inefficiencies driven by the tension of overbidding. For this
reason, sequential auctions are pathologically inappropriate mechanisms when valuations are not
concave or monotone. Many practical sequential multiunit auctions therefore assume (or impose)
2The exposure problem arises when a buyer has large value for a set S of items but much less value for strict
subsets of S. Thus bidding for the items of S sold early in the auction exposes the buyer to a high risk if he fails to
win the later items of S.
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that buyers declare concave non-decreasing valuations. For example, in cap-and-trade (sequential)
auctions, such as the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (RGGI), multiple items are sold in each time period but bids are constrained to be weakly
decreasing. We follow the literature on multiunit sequential auctions and focus on concave and
non-decreasing valuations, where a no-overbidding constraint is more natural.
2.3 Tie-Breaking Rules
When overbidding is allowed the forward utilities at equilibria are unique (see also [8]), regardless
of the tie-breaking rule. Surprisingly, this is not the case when overbidding is prohibited:
Example 3: Take a four round auction, where vi(k) = 1 for k ≤ 3 and vi(k) = 0 otherwise.
Solving backwards, the forward utilities are the same for every non-source node whether or not
overbidding is permitted. In particular, at the successor nodes of the source we have ui(ei) = 2 and
ui(e−i) = 1. But now a difference occurs. Without the overbidding constraint, both buyers would
bid 2 at the source node 0 and, regardless of the winner, each buyer has ui(0) = 1. But with the
no-overbidding constraint both buyers will bid 1. Consequently, if this tie is broken in favour of
buyer 1 with probability p, then buyer 1 has forward utility u1(0) = 1+ p and buyer 2 has forward
utility u2(0) = 2− p, so buyers’ payoffs depend on p.
Thus, under no-overbidding we need to account for the tie-breaking process. To do this, let
b = (b1, b2) where bi : H+ → R is the bidding strategy of buyer i. Given the bids at the node x,
let πi(b|x) denote the probability buyer i is awarded the item, where πi(b|x) = 1 if bi(x) > b−i(x).
This defines a tie-breaking rule at each node, and the forward utility of each buyer can again be
calculated inductively. For any terminal node x ∈ H0 the forward utility is zero: ui(b|x) = 0. The
forward utility of buyer i at decision node x ∈ H+ is then:
ui(b|x) = πi(b|x) · (vi(1|x) − b−i(x) + ui(b|x+ ei)) + (1− πi(b|x)) · ui(b|x+ e−i)
With the tie-breaking rule defined, the (expected) forward utilities at equilibria are thus unique.
Moreover, there is a unique bidding strategy b which survives the iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies. Specifically, under the no-overbidding condition, at any node x each bidder
should bid the minimum of its marginal value for winning and its incremental value:
bi(x) = min
[
vi(1|x) , vi(1|x) + ui(b|x+ ei)− ui(b|x+ e−i)
]
(2)
3 Greedy Bidding Strategies
To understand equilibria in two-buyer sequential auctions with no-overbidding, we need to consider
greedy bidding strategies. At decision node x, suppose buyer i attempts to win exactly k items by
the following strategy: she waits (bids zero) for t− k rounds and then outbids buyer −i in the final
k rounds. For this, by the no-overbidding assumption, she must bid ≥ v−i(1|(t − k) · e−i) in the
final k rounds. If this strategy to be implementable, it must be that:
vi(k|x) ≥ v−i(t− k + 1|x)
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This strategy would then give buyer i a utility of:
µ¯i(k|x) =
k∑
j=1
vi(j|x) − k · v−i(t− k + 1|x) (3)
If buyer i attempts to apply this greedy strategy, it should select k to maximize its profit µ¯i(k|x).
So in equilibrium, buyer i should earn at least the maximum of these utilities over all feasible
k. Remarkably, this property need not be true for equilibria when overbidding is allowed; see
Example 4 below.
Buyer i’s greedy utility at decision node x is the resultant utility from applying its greedy
strategy from x:
µi(x) = max
k∈[t]∪{0}
µ¯i(k|x) (4)
In turn, buyer i’s corresponding greedy demand at x is:
κi(x) = min arg max
k∈[t]∪{0}
µ¯i(k|x) (5)
But when can buyer i profitably apply this greedy strategy? It can apply it whenever it has
duopsony power. In a sequential auction this ability arises when vi(1|x) > v−i(t|x). Formally, let
buyer i’s duopsony factor at x be:
fi(x) = max{k ∈ [t] : vi(k|x) > v−i(t− k + 1|x)} ∪ {0} (6)
Observe that if fi(x) = 0 then buyer i cannot apply the greedy strategy, and we then have µi(x) = 0
and κi(x) = 0. On the other hand, if fi(x) > 0 then µi(x) > 0, and any maximizer of µi(x) is
necessarily at most fi(x).
We say that a buyer is a monopsonist if the other buyer has no duopsony power, that is, if
f−i(x) = 0. In turn, a buyer is a strict monopsonist if she has total duopsony power, i.e. fi(x) = t.
So in a sequential auction with no-overbidding, a strict monopsonist can guarantee it gains at least
its greedy utility. This is analogous to the corresponding static market setting. However, this
simple fact can fail to hold when overbidding occurs:
Example 4: Consider a three-item auction, where v1(k) = 1 for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and buyer 2 has
incremental valuations
(
v2(1), v2(2), v2(3)
)
= (2/3− δ, 1/2 + ǫ, 0), where we fix ǫ, δ > 0 to be small
with 2ǫ = 3δ. With overbidding permitted, in equilibrium with ties broken in favour of buyer 2,
buyer 1 wins a single item.
Figure 3 illustrates this example. The key observation here is that b2(0) = 2/3 − δ + 2ǫ >
2/3− δ = v2(1), so buyer 2 overbids at the source node. Furthermore, buyer 1 obtains a profit of 1
in this equilibrium with overbidding, but µ¯1(3|0) = 1+3δ. So in the equilibrium with overbidding,
buyer 1 obtains less than her greedy utility. In contrast, under no-incremental overbidding, buyer 1
will win all three items and make exactly her greedy utility.
The greedy strategy induces two types of “price” that will be important. First, we say that the
baseline price of buyer i at decision node x is:
βi(x, t) =
{
vi(1|x) fi(x) = 0
v−i(t− κi(x) + 1|x) fi(x) > 0
(7)
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(0,0)–3
1 : 0
(0,1)–2
1 : 2ǫ
(1,0)–2
2
3 + 2δ : 0
(1,1)–1
1
2 − ǫ : 0
(0,2)–1
1: 0
(2,0)–1
1
3 + δ : 0
(3,0)–0
0 : 0
(2,1)–0
0 : 0
(1,2)–0
0 : 0
(0,3)–0
0 : 0
2
3 + 2δ
2
3 − δ + 2ǫ
5
6 + δ + ǫ
2
3 − δ
1
2 − ǫ
1
2 + ǫ
1 23 − δ 1
1
2 + ǫ 1 0
Figure 3: A sequential auction with overbidding permitted where neither buyer exhibits monopo-
listic behaviours.
Second, the threshold price of buyer i at decision node x is:
pi(x) = vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i) (8)
The baseline price may be seen as the price a greedy buyer would post if it wanted to obtain its
greedy utility. By posting a bid of βi(x)+ ǫ on each node following x, buyer i would be guaranteed,
by the no-overbidding condition, to win at least κi(x) items. The threshold price, in turn, arises
from a behavioural rule: it is the bid a buyer would make on the assumption that it wins exactly
its greedy utility through the rest of the auction.
4 Greedy Bidding Outcomes
Now imagine that buyers attempt to bid their threshold prices at each decision node, subject
to the no-overbidding constraint. By definition (8) of threshold prices, this corresponds to the
behavioural rule where buyers perceive their forward utilities to equal their greedy utilities, and
bid accordingly. We will discover in Section 5 that such greedy bidding strategies are in some
circumstances equivalent to equilibrium bidding strategies under the no-overbidding assumption.
Accordingly, to understand equilibria we must study the consequences of greedy bidding. So,
in this section, we will inspect the properties of greedy outcomes.
4.1 Evolution of the Duopsony Factor
Recall the duopsony factor denotes the maximum number of items a buyer can target using the
greedy bidding strategy – we first inspect its evolution:
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that x is a decision node with t > 1, then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}:
fi(x+ ei) = min{fi(x)− 1, 0}
fi(x+ e−i) = min{fi(x), t− 1}
To prove Lemma 4.1 we break the statement up to three claims which we prove separately. The
first claim shows that a buyer will no duopsony power will remain so for the rest of the auction.
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Claim 4.2. If buyer i has no duopsony power at decision node x, where t > 1, then it has no
duopsony power at any subsequent node. Formally, for any j ∈ {1, 2},
fi(x) = 0 =⇒ fi(x+ ej) = 0
Proof. Let fi(x) = 0. Then, by definition (6) of the duopsony factor, for any k ≤ t, we have
v−i(t− k + 1|x) ≥ vi(k|x). Hence:
v−i(t− 1− k + 1|x+ e−i) = v−i(t− k + 1|x)
≥ vi(k|x)
= vi(k|x+ e−i) (9)
Here the first equality holds because v−i(j|x + e−i) = v−i(j + 1|x) for any j ∈ Z. The second
equality holds because the incremental values of buyer i are independent of the allocation to the
buyer −i and so vi(k|x+e−i) = vi(k|x). Because t− 1 < t, it follows from (9) that fi(x+e−i) = 0.
Similarly, for any k ≤ t, we have:
v−i(t− 1− k + 1|x+ ei) = v−i(t− 1− k + 1|x)
≥ vi(k + 1|x)
= vi(k|x + ei)
Therefore fi(x+ ei, t− 1) = 0.
Recall, a buyer i is a strict monopsonist at x if fi(x) = t. The next claim shows that a strict
monopsonist remains a strict monopsonist throughout the auction.
Claim 4.3. If buyer i is a strict monopsonist at decision node x, where t > 1, then it is a strict
monopsonist at every subsequent node. Formally, for any j ∈ {1, 2},
fi(x) = t =⇒ fi(x+ ej) = t− 1
Proof. Suppose fi(x) = t, then vi(t|x) > v−i(1|x). Then:
vi(t− 1|x+ ei) = vi(t|x) > v−i(1|x) = v−i(1|x + ei)
Here the first and second equalities result from considering the shift x→ x+ ei on the valuations.
The strict inequality results from the assumption fi(x) = t. So, fi(x+ ei) = t− 1. Similarly:
vi(t− 1|x+ e−i) = vi(t− 1|x)
≥ vi(t|x)
> v−i(1|x)
≥ v−i(2|x)
= v−i(1|x + e−i)
Here, the first and last equalities result from considering the shift x → x+ e−i on the valuations.
The inequalities result from the assumption of non-increasing incremental values, and the strict
inequality follows from the assumption fi(x) = t. So fi(x+ e−i) = t− 1.
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The third claim examines the intermediate case in which a buyer has duopsony power but is
not a strict monopsonist.
Claim 4.4. Let buyer i have duopsony power but not total duopsony power at decision node x,
where t > 1. If it wins the current item then the maximum number of items to which it can apply
the greedy bidding strategy falls by exactly one; it if loses the current item then the maximum number
of items to which it can apply the greedy bidding strategy remains the same. Formally,
0 < fi(x) < t =⇒
{
fi(x+ ei) = fi(x)− 1
fi(x+ e−i) = fi(x)
Proof. Note first that vi(k|x + e−i) = vi(k|x) and v−i((t − 1) − k + 1|x + e−i) = v−i(t − k + 1|x)
by considering the shift in incremental valuations x → x + e−i. Since 0 < fi(x) ≤ t − 1, for
k ≤ fi(x), vi(k|x) > v−i(t − k + 1|x) and for k > fi(x), vi(k|x) ≤ v−i(t − k + 1|x). Therefore,
fi(x+ e−i) = fi(x).
Similarly, vi(k|x+ei) = vi(k+1|x) and v−i((t−1)−k+1|x+ei) = v−i(t−k|x), by considering
the shift in incremental valuations x → x + ei. Now 0 < fi(x) ≤ t− 1. Thus, by definition (6) of
the duopsony factor, for k + 1 ≤ fi(x) we have vi(k + 1|x) > v−i(t− k|x) and for k + 1 > fi(x) we
have vi(k + 1|x) ≤ v−i(t− k|x). Therefore, fi(x+ ei) = fi(x) − 1.
4.1.1 Evolution of Greedy Utilities
Next, we analyse the evolution of buyers’ greedy utilities. We find that some buyer i’s greedy utility
will decrease upon the other buyer’s win if and only if she is a strict monopsonist who demands the
entire supply. In turn, we bound below the decrease in buyer i’s greedy utility if she has duopsony
power and wins an item.
Lemma 4.5. The greedy utility of a buyer weakly decreases when the buyer loses. Specifically, for
any decision node x and any buyer i,
µi(x+ e−i) = µi(x) if κi(x) < t
µi(x+ e−i) < µi(x) if κi(x) = t
In turn, if buyer i has non-zero greedy demand at decision node x and wins an item, then its greedy
utility decreases by at most the value it would have for purchasing an item at his baseline price.
Formally, ∀x ∈ H+,∀i ∈ {1, 2}:
κi(x) > 0⇒ µi(x+ ei) ≥ µi(x)− vi(1|x) + βi(x)
To prove Lemma 4.5, we will first prove two claims about the payoff of the greedy strategy
targeting the purchase of k items. Our first claim states that the greedy utility does not change if
the buyer loses the first item, provided its greedy strategy was not attempting to win every item.
Claim 4.6. At decision node x, the utility to a buyer from targetting less than t items using
the greedy strategy remains constant when the buyer loses. Specifically, for any buyer i and any
k ≤ t− 1,
µ¯i(k|x + e−i) = µ¯i(k|x)
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Proof. By definition (3) of µ¯, we have
µ¯i(k|x+ e−i) =
k∑
j=1
vi(j|x + e−i)− k · v−i(t− 1− k + 1|x+ e−i)
=
k∑
j=1
vi(j|x + e−i)− k · v−i(t− k|x+ e−i)
=
k∑
j=1
vi(j|x) − k · v−i(t− k|x+ e−i)
=
k∑
j=1
vi(j|x) − k · v−i(t− k + 1|x)
= µ¯i(k|x)
Here, the first and last equality hold by the definition of µ¯, the second equality holds by simplifying
the expression in vi(·|x + ei), and third and fourth equalities hold by considering the shift in
valuations x→ x+ e−i.
In contrast, if the buyer targets k items using the greedy bidding strategy then its utility can
change if it successfully wins the first item.
Claim 4.7. Let x be a decision node where t > 1. Then for any buyer i and any k ≤ t
µ¯i(k − 1|x+ ei) = µ¯i(k|x)− vi(1|x) + v−i(t− k + 1|x)
Proof. By definition (3) of µ¯, we have
µ¯i(k − 1|x+ ei) =
k−1∑
j=1
vi(j|x + ei)− (k − 1) · v−i((t− 1)− (k − 1) + 1|x+ ei)
=
k−1∑
j=1
vi(j + 1|x) − (k − 1) · v−i(t− k + 1|x+ ei)
=
k−1∑
j=1
vi(j + 1|x) − (k − 1) · v−i(t− k + 1|x)
=
k∑
j=2
vi(j|x) − (k − 1) · v−i(t− k + 1|x)
= µ¯i(k|x) − vi(1|x) + v−i(t− k + 1|x)
Again, the first and last equalities hold by the definition of µ¯. The second equality follows by sim-
plifying the expression in vi(·|x+ei), the third equality holds by considering the shift in incremental
valuations x→ x+ ei, and the fourth equality holds by a change of variables.
Let us now prove Lemma 4.5. We want to show that, at any decision node x, if a buyer i greedy
demand corresponds to the entire set of items for sale, then its greedy utility strictly decreases if
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buyer −i wins an item at x. If instead buyer i’s greedy demand does not correspond to all the
items up for sale, then buyer i’s greedy utility does not change if buyer −i wins an item at x.
Proof (of Lemma 4.5). By definition (4) of the greedy utility and by Claim 4.6, we have
µi(x+ e−i) = max
k∈[t−1]∪{0}
µ¯i(k|x+ e−i)
= max
k∈[t−1]∪{0}
µ¯i(k|x)
≤ max
k∈[t]∪{0}
µ¯i(k|x)
= µi(x) (10)
But equality holds in the second inequality if and only if κi(x) < t. The first part of the lemma
then follows immediately from (10).
Observe that if buyer i wins at decision node x and then wins k − 1 items implementing its
greedy strategy, then its profit is exactly µ¯i(k − 1|x+ ei) + vi(1|x) − b−i(x). By Claim 4.7, this is
greater than µ¯i(k|x) if the other buyer bid b−i(x) < v−i(t− k + 1|x). Setting k = κi(x) shows the
second part of the lemma.
4.1.2 Evolution of Greedy Demand
Next, we turn attention to how the demand evolves. We show that, if the greedy demand of a buyer
is less than the entire supply, then it remains constant upon losing the current item. Intuitively,
we could assume that buyer i did not demand the item for sale at x, so we could assume that the
demand was a subset of the supply at x + e−i. If instead buyer i wins an item, then its greedy
demand can decrease by at most one. In particular, if buyer i demands the entire supply at decision
node x, upon winning an item, it will continue to demand the entire supply.
Lemma 4.8. For any x ∈ H+ and any i ∈ {1, 2}:
κi(x) < t⇒ κi(x+ e−i) = κi(x)
t > 1⇒ κi(x+ ei) ≥ κi(x)− 1
t > 1, κi(x) = t⇒ κi(x+ ei) = t− 1
As before, we divide Lemma 4.8 into several separate statements. First, note that proof of
Claim 4.4 implies that, if the buyer does not demand the entire supply, then its demand will not
change if it loses:
Corollary 4.9. If the greedy demand of a buyer is less than the entire supply then it remains
constant upon losing the current item. That is,
κi(x) < t =⇒ κi(x+ e−i) = κi(x)
Proof. By the proof of Claim 4.4, µi(x+ e−i) = maxk∈[t−1]∪{0} µ¯i(k|x). Note that:
κi(x+ e−i) = min arg max
k∈[t−1]∪{0}
µ¯i(k|x)
κi(x) = min arg max
k∈[t]∪{0}
µ¯i(k|x)
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Suppose that κi(x) 6= κi(x+ e−i) – this can only be the case if:
t = arg max
k∈[t]∪{0}
µ¯i(k|x)
This contradicts the fact that κi(x) < t.
The next lemma concerns the behaviour of the greedy demand κi(x) if buyer i wins: upon
purchasing an item, buyer i’s greedy demand cannot decrease too much.
Lemma 4.10. The greedy demand of a buyer can decrease by at most one when the buyer wins.
Specifically, for any decision node x with t > 1 and any buyer i,
κi(x+ ei) ≥ κi(x)− 1
Proof. If κi(x) ≤ 1, the result is trivial. So assume that κi(x) > 1. Now, to simplify the notation
that follows, set κi = κi(x). Because κi is the smallest number of items the buyer can target to
obtain its maximum utility via the greedy bidding strategy, we have µ¯i(k|x) < µ¯i(κi|x) for any
k < κi. This fact gives
µ¯i(κi − 1|x + ei) = µ¯i(κi|x)− v1(1|x) + v−i(t− κi − 1|x+ ei)
> µ¯i(k|x) − v1(1|x) + v−i(t− κi − 1|x+ ei)
≥ µ¯i(k|x) − v1(1|x) + v−i(t− k − 1|x+ ei)
= µ¯i(k − 1|x+ ei) (11)
Here the two equalities are applications of Claim 4.7. The weak inequality follows because the
incremental values of buyer −i are weakly decreasing.
So (11) tells us that µ¯i(κi− 1|x+ ei) > µ¯i(k− 1|x+ ei) for any k < κi. The result immediately
follows.
Lemma 4.10 implies that if a buyer’s short-sighted optimization problem compels it to demand
the entire supply, then it will still demand all the remaining supply upon winning that round.
Corollary 4.11. If the greedy demand of a buyer is the entire supply then, upon winning the
current item, it will continue to demand the entire remaining supply. That is,
κi(x) = t =⇒ κi(x+ ei) = t− 1
4.1.3 Evolution of Baseline and Threshold Prices
Finally, we inspect the evolution of baseline and threshold prices. The first lemma shows that the
baseline price is a lower bound for the threshold price. Intuitively, if buyer i can win an item at
a price no greater than the baseline price, by Lemma 4.5 she would be able to obtain at least her
greedy outcome, so her threshold price cannot be less than her baseline price.
Lemma 4.12. For any x ∈ H+ and any i ∈ {1, 2}, pi(x) ≥ βi(x).
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Proof. First consider the case fi(x) = 0. Then buyer i has no duopsony power and, by Claim 4.2,
we have fi(x+ ej) = 0, for any buyer j. Consequently µi(x+ ej) = 0. Thus, by definition (8), the
threshold price satisfies
pi(x) = vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i)
= vi(1|x)
Similarly, by definition (7), we have βi(x) = vi(1|x). Thus the baseline and threshold prices are
equal.
Next, consider the case fi(x) = 1. Then fi(x+ ei) = fi(x)− 1 = 0 by Claim 4.4, hence:
µi(x+ ei) = 0 (12)
Now partition the analysis in two further cases. First, assume t > 1. Then, again by Claim 4.4, we
have fi(x+ e−i) = fi(x) = 1. So the greedy demands satisfy κi(x+ e−i) = κi(x) = 1. Therefore,
µi(x+ e−i) = µ¯i(1|x + e−i)
= vi(1|x + e−i)− v−i(t− 1|x+ e−i)
= vi(1|x) − v−i(t|x) (13)
= µ¯i(1|x)
= µi(x)
Because fi(x) > 0, by definition (7), the baseline price is
βi(x) = v−i(t− κi(x) + 1|x) = v−i(t|x) (14)
Thus, the threshold price is given by
pi(x) = vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i)
= vi(1|x) − µi(x+ e−i)
= vi(1|x) − (vi(1|x) − v−i(t|x))
= v−i(t|x)
= βi(x)
Here the second, third and fifth equalities follows from (12), (13) and (14), respectively. Thus,
again, the baseline and threshold prices are equal.
Second assume instead that t = 1. Because this is then the final round, we have µi(x +
ei) = µi(x + e−i) = 0. The threshold price is then pi(x) = vi(1|x). Now as fi(x) = 1 we have
vi(1|x) > v−i(t|x) = βi(x). So the threshold price is strictly greater than the baseline price.
Finally consider the case fi(x) > 1. Then, by Lemma 4.1, we have fi(x + ej) ≥ fi(x) − 1 ≥ 1
for any buyer j. Now, denoting κi(x) as κi,
µi(x+ ei) = max
k∈[t−1]
µ¯i(k|x+ ei)
≥ µ¯i(κi − 1|x+ ei)
= µ¯i(κi|x)− vi(1|x) + v−i(t− κi + 1|x)
= µ¯i(κi|x)− vi(1|x) + βi(x) (15)
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Here the inequality follows from considering a specific solution to the maximization problem. The
first equality follows from Claim 4.7, and the final equality follows from the definition of (7) of the
baseline price βi(x). Plugging (15) into the definition (8) of the threshold price, we obtain:
pi(x) = vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i)
≥ vi(1|x) + µ¯i(κi|x)− vi(1|x) + βi(x)− µi(x+ e−i)
= βi(x) + µi(x) − µi(x+ e−i) (16)
By Lemma 4.5, we know that µi(x) ≥ µi(x + e−i). Hence (16) implies that the threshold price is
at least the baseline price.
Moreover, if buyer i’s greedy demand corresponds to the entire supply, it should ensure that
it wins every item while targeting his greedy utility. This implies the inequality of Lemma 4.12
should become strict.
Lemma 4.13. If the greedy demand of a buyer is the entire supply then the threshold price is
strictly greater than the baseline price. Specifically,
κi(x) = t =⇒ pi(x) > βi(x)
Proof. By assumption κi(x) = t, hence by Corollary 4.11, we have κi(x+ ei) = t− 1. Then:
µi(x+ ei) = µ¯i(t− 1|x+ ei) (17)
Furthermore, by Claim 4.7,
µ¯i(t− 1|x+ ei) = µ¯i(t|x) + vi(1|x)− v−i(1|x) (18)
Finally, by Lemma 4.5, we have
µi(x) > µi(x+ e−i) (19)
Thus the threshold price at the decision node (x, t) satisfies
pi(x) = vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i)
= vi(1|x) + µ¯i(t− 1|x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i)
= vi(1|x) + (µ¯i(t|x)− vi(1|x) + v−i(1|x)) − µi(x+ e−i)
= v−i(1|x) + µ¯i(t|x)− µi(x+ e−i)
= v−i(1|x) + µi(x)− µi(x+ e−i)
> v−i(1|x) (20)
Here the second and third equalities are due to (17) and (18), respectively. The strict inequality
follows from (19).
To conclude, recall that κi(x) = t implies that the baseline price is βi(x) = v−i(t−κi(x)+1|x) =
v−i(1|x). Substituting into (20) gives pi(x) > βi(x) and so the threshold price strictly exceeds the
baseline price.
Instead consider the case when some buyer i with duopsony power does not demand the entire
supply. Suppose that, buyer i wins an item, and still has duopsony power after doing so. As its
demand will not decrease significantly, its baseline price will be weakly higher. We would then
presume that buyer i is in a situation that favours buying more items, hence it would be willing to
pay higher prices.
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Lemma 4.14. Given x ∈ H+ and i ∈ {1, 2} such that fi(x) > 1 and κi(x) < t. Then βi(x+ ei) ≥
pi(x), where equality holds only if µ¯(κi(x+ ei) + 1|x) = µi(x). Moreover, pi(x+ ei) ≥ pi(x).
Proof. Let us first prove the first part of the statement. As κi(x) < t, we have: µi(x) = µi(x+e−i)
by Lemma 4.8. Setting kˆ = κi(x+ ei), the threshold price is then
pi(x) = vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i)
= vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x)
= vi(1|x) +
kˆ∑
j=1
vi(j|x + ei)− kˆ · v−i(t− kˆ|x+ ei)− µi(x)
= vi(1|x) +
kˆ∑
j=1
vi(j + 1|x) − kˆ · v−i(t− kˆ|x+ ei)− µi(x)
=
kˆ+1∑
j=1
vi(j|x) − kˆ · v−i(t− kˆ|x+ ei)− µi(x) (21)
On the other hand,
kˆ · v−i(t− kˆ|x+ ei) = (kˆ + 1) · v−i(t− kˆ|x+ ei)− v−i(t− kˆ|x+ ei)
= (kˆ + 1) · v−i(t− kˆ|x)− v−i(t− kˆ|x+ ei)
= (kˆ + 1) · v−i(t− kˆ|x)− βi(x+ ei) (22)
Together (21) and (22) give
pi(x) =
kˆ+1∑
j=1
vi(j|x) −
(
(kˆ + 1) · v−i(t− kˆ|x)− βi(x+ ei)
)
− µi(x)
= µ¯i(kˆ + 1|x) + βi(x+ ei)− µi(x)
≤ βi(x+ ei)
Here, the inequality is tight only if µi(x) = µ¯i(kˆ + 1|x).
Now we show that the threshold price weakly increases – we have two cases to analyse. First,
assume that κi(x+ ei) < t− 1. Then:
pi(x+ ei) ≥ βi(x+ ei)
≥ pi(x)
Here the first inequality follows from Lemma 4.12.
Second, assume that κi(x+ ei) = t− 1. Then:
pi(x+ ei) > βi(x+ ei)
≥ pi(x)
Now the first inequality instead follows from Lemma 4.13.
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If instead buyer −i wins at x, then buyer i loses the opportunity to apply its greedy strategy
to win t items from x. If buyer i still does not demand the entire supply at x+ e−i, then this loss
of opportunity translates to a lesser incentive to purchase at a given price:
Lemma 4.15. Given x ∈ H+ and i ∈ {1, 2} such that fi(x) > 1 but κi(x) < t − 1. Then
pi(x+ e−i, t− 1) ≤ pi(x, t). Moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if κi(x+ ei) = t− 1.
Proof. Take κi(x) < t− 1. Then, by definition (8) of threshold prices, we have that:
pi(x)− pi(x+ e−i) =
(
vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i)
)
−
(
vi(1|x + e−i) + µi(x+ ei + e−i)− µi(x+ 2e−i)
)
= µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ ei + e−i)
≥ 0
Here the first equality follows by the definition of threshold prices. The second equality and the
inequality follow from Lemma 4.5. Again by Lemma 4.5, the inequality is strict if and only if
κi(x+ ei) = t− 1.
Finally, if buyer i with duopsony power targets his greedy utility and does not demand the
entire supply, then incentives for buyer −i are aligned such that it should want to purchase items
without letting buyer i win. Buyer −i would be able to do so if buyer i’s bids do not exceed
buyer −i’s incremental value. The following lemma shows that this is the case.
Lemma 4.16. Given x ∈ H+ and i ∈ {1, 2}. If κi(x) < t and fi(x) > 0 then pi(x) ≤ v−i(t −
κi(x+ ei)|x). Moreover, the inequality is tight if only if µ¯i(κi(x+ ei) + 1|x) = µi(x).
Proof. Set kˆ = κi(x+ ei). Then, by definition (8) of threshold prices,
pi(x) = vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x+ e−i)
= vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µi(x)
≤ vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µ¯i(kˆ + 1|x)
= vi(1|x) + µi(x+ ei)−
(
µ¯i(kˆ|x+ ei) + vi(1|x) − v−i(t− kˆ|x)
)
= v−i(t− kˆ|x) + µi(x+ ei)− µ¯i(kˆ|x+ ei)
= v−i(t− kˆ|x) (23)
The second equality holds by Lemma 4.5 because κi(x) < t. The first inequality holds due to the
optimality of the choice κi(x). The third equality is an application of Claim 4.7 with k = kˆ + 1 =
κi(x + ei) + 1. The fifth equality holds as kˆ = κi(x + ei). For (23) to be tight, we require that
µ¯i(kˆ + 1|x) = µi(x).
4.1.4 Auction Outcomes with Greedy Bidding Strategies
We are now ready to use our analysis of quantities induced by greedy bidding to inspect what
happens in the auction when both buyers use their greedy bidding strategies. Note that realised
quantities are those reached in the outcome with positive probability. Tie-breaking rules can
introduce randomisation of the allocations and prices buyers face each round, but we are able to
make a statement for any realisation of these quantities.
17
Theorem 4.17. Suppose buyers implement their greedy bidding strategies. Then on any realised
outcome path from some decision node x, if there exists a monopsonist buyer i at x, then her
realised utility is µi(x); else some buyer i ∈ argminj∈{1,2} pi(x) has realised utility equal to µi(x).
Furthermore, buyer i purchases at least κi(x) items. Finally, prices are equal to pi alongside the
realised outcome path until buyer i demands the entire supply, after which prices equal βi. In
particular, prices are declining along any realised outcome path.
Proof. Proceed by induction on t: if t = 1, then pi(x) = vi(1|x) for any buyer i, so we have the
standard equilibrium for a single-item second-price auction, which satisfies the necessary conditions.
So suppose that t > 1. First suppose that no buyer has any duopsony power. Then by definition
6 of duopsony power, for any i, j ∈ {1, 2} and k, l ∈ [t], vi(k) = vj(l), i.e. all incremental valuations
are equal to some w ≥ 0. In this case, at every node x′ of the auction rooted at decision node x,
pi(x
′) = βi(x
′) = w, and ui(x
′) = µi(x
′) = 0. This satisfies the conditions of the theorem.
Now suppose that buyer i is a monopsonist at x with positive duopsony power, then by Lemma
4.1, buyer i is a monopsonist at every node of the auction tree rooted at x. Therefore, buyer i
attains its greedy utility in every subsequent node. Now, by Lemma 4.13 if buyer i demands the
entire supply, then min{pi(x), vi(1|x)} > βi(x) = p−i(x), so buyer i wins with probability 1 at x.
At decision node x+ ei, by Corollary 4.11, buyer i demands the entire supply, so by the induction
hypothesis she keeps winning at price v−i(1|x) = βi(x). Then prices are constant along the outcome
path, and the realised utility of buyer 1 is
∑T
k=1 vi(k|x) − t · v−i(1|x) = µi(x).
Instead suppose κi(x) < t. Then p−i(x) = v−i(1|x), and by Lemma 5, pi(x) ≤ v−i(1|x).
Therefore, the price equals pi(x) at decision node x. If buyer −i wins at decision node x, then
buyer i’s realised utility equals µi(x + e−i), which by Lemma 4.5 equals µi(x). Furthermore, by
Lemma 4.15, pi(x + e−i) ≤ pi(x), so prices are non-increasing. Now suppose that buyer i wins
at decision node x. Then pi(x) = v−i(1|x). By Lemma 5, this can only happen if v−i(1|x) =
v−i(t− κi(x+ ei)|x) = βi(x+ e−i) and µi(x+ ei) + vi(1|x) − v−i(1|x) = µi(x). Then prices equal
to v−i(1|x) for the rest of the auction, and buyer i earns her greedy utility.
Finally, suppose fi(x) > 0 for any j ∈ {1, 2}, and that buyer i wins at x. Then price is equal
to p−i(x). If buyer −i is a monopsonist at x + ei, then by the induction hypothesis and Lemma
4.15, we have the desired result. If not, then by Lemma 4.14 and Lemma 4.15, pi(x+ei) ≥ pi(x) ≥
p−i(x) ≥ p−i(x + ei). If buyer −i is the member of argminj∈{1,2} pi(x + ei) who has realised
utility equal to µ−i(x + ei), then we have the desired result. If instead it is buyer i, note that
pi(x+ ei) = p−i(x+ ei). Therefore, the price at x equals pi(x), and prices do not increase from x
to x+ ei. Finally, as µi(x+ e−i) = µi(x+ ei) by Lemma 4.5, µi(x) = vi(1|x)− pi(x) + µi(x+ ei),
hence buyer i’s realised utility equals her greedy utility.
It remains to show that each buyer j purchases at least κj(x) items from any outcome path
starting from x. The proof is again by induction on t – if t = 1, a buyer j with κj(x) = 1 has
vj(1|x) > v−j(1|x), hence he necessarily wins an item. Now suppose that t > 1. If κj(x) = t, then
as argued above buyer j purchases all items at price βj(x), hence buyer j indeed purchases t items.
If κj(x) < t, then κj(x+ ej) ≥ κj(x)− 1 and κj(x+ e−j) = κj(x), so whoever wins at x, a realised
outcome path proceeds to an outcome which awards buyer j a number of items ≥ κj(x) onwards
from x.
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5 Characterisation of No-Overbidding Equilibria
In this section, we classify the equilibria of two-buyer sequential multiunit auctions under the no-
overbidding condition. Structurally, we will see that any equilibrium is made up of three phases (a
competitive phase, a competition reduction phase and a monopsony phase) characterized by very
different strategic behaviours.
First, however, let’s show that the declining price anomaly holds. Here, it is worth emphasizing
declining prices do not follow as a direct consequence of the no-overbidding assumption. Indeed,
for ≥ 3 buyers, the declining price anomaly can fail to hold given decreasing incremental valuations
even with the no-overbidding assumption; see Prebet et al. [13]. The proof of the declining price
anomaly depends instead on a weaker version of Equation (8) in [8], which survives the imposition
of the no-overbidding constraint.
Lemma 5.1. Let x be a decision node and let p(x) denote the price paid at x. Then for any buyer
i, p(x) ≤ vi(1|x) + ui(x+ ei)− ui(x).
Proof. If buyer i wins with probability 1 at decision node x, then the inequality holds with equality.
Otherwise, suppose that buyer i wins with probability q < 1 at decision node x. Then:
ui(x) = q · (vi(1|x)− p(x) + ui(x+ ei)) + (1− q) · ui(x+ e−i)
Now suppose for a contradiction that p(x) > vi(1|x) + ui(x + ei) − ui(x). Then, plugging in the
above expression:
p(x) > vi(1|x) + ui(x+ ei)− ui(x+ e−i)
However, p(x) = minj∈{1,2} bj(x) ≤ bi(x), and by Equation 2:
bi(x) ≤ vi(1|x) + ui(x+ ei)− ui(x+ e−i)⇒⇐
The lemma allows us to adapt the declining price anomaly proof of Gale and Stegeman [8]:
Theorem 5.2. In a two-buyer sequential multiunit auction, under equilibrium bidding strategies,
prices are non-increasing along any realised equilibrium path.
Proof. Suppose that WLOG buyer 1 wins with positive probability at decision node x, with t > 1
– we will show that p(x) ≥ p(x+e1). If buyer 2’s no-overbidding constraint was binding at x, then
we are done, since p(x+e1) ≤ v2(1|x) = p(x). So suppose that buyer 2’s no-overbidding constraint
does not bind, then:
p(x) = v2(1|x) + u2(x+ e2)− u2(x+ e1)
On the other hand, by Lemma 5.1:
p(x+ e1) ≤ v2(1|x) + u2(x+ (1, 1)) − u2(x+ e1)
Subtracting the two equations, we get:
p(x)− p(x+ e1) ≥ u2(x+ e2)− u2(x+ (1, 1))
However, the RHS must be ≥ 0, or buyer 2 would have a profitable deviation at x+ e2 by bidding
b1(x) − ǫ for ǫ > 0. That is impossible since bidding strategies are the unique ones surviving the
iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
19
We now proceed to show when there necessarily is a direct equivalence between greedy bidding
and equilibrium bidding strategies: it is exactly when there exists a monopsonist.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that at decision node x, some buyer i is a monopsonist. Then for any
decision node x′ of the auction tree rooted at x, prices and utilities are equal for equilibrium and
greedy bidding strategies.
Proof. Proceed by induction on t: for t = 1, the statement is obvious, so suppose t > 1, and
consider equilibrium bidding strategies from decision node x, where buyer i is a monopsonist. As
the existence of a monopsonist is a hereditary property on the auction graph, buyer i is again a
monopsonist at the successor nodes to x. Therefore, ui(x+ ej) = µi(x+ ej) for any decision node,
hence buyer i bids bi(x) = min{pi(x), v1(1|x)} as intended.
First consider the case if buyer i has no duopsony power, then both buyers are monopsonists.
As being a monopsonist is a hereditary property, uj(x+eℓ) = 0 for any j, ℓ ∈ {1, 2} by the induction
hypothesis, hence each buyer j bids pj(x) = vj(1|x). In this case, bids for greedy and equilibrium
bidding strategies are equal at x, hence by the induction hypothesis prices and utilities are equal
for equilibrium and greedy bidding strategies as desired.
So we consider the case if buyer i does have duopsony power. If pi(x) > v−i(1|x), then by
Lemma 4.13 and Lemma 5, buyer i demands t items. Then buyer i purchases an item at price
βi(x) = v−i(1|x) at decision node x. Then by Lemma 4.8, κi(x + e1) = t− 1, so by the induction
hypothesis, buyer i keeps purchasing the rest of the items at price v−i(1|x) as desired.
Now suppose that pi(x) ≤ v−i(1|x), then by Lemma 4.13, buyer i demands < t items. Further-
more, as buyer i has duopsony power then buyer i bids bi(x) = pi(x) by Lemma 5. First consider the
case if buyer −i’s no-overbidding constraint binds – then buyer −i bids v−i(1|x), so bids at decision
node x are equal for equilibrium and greedy bidding strategies. Then by the induction hypothesis
the outcomes from decision node x are also equal for equilibrium and greedy bidding strategies.
Therefore, we need to only consider the case if b−i(x) = v−i(1|x)+ui(x+e−i)−ui(x+ei) < v−i(1|x).
Note that in this case, buyer −i must have positive forward utility at x + ei, hence buyer i does
not demand the entire supply after winning an item.
If buyer −i wins at decision node x, then the outcome at decision node x does not change
if buyer −i deviates to bidding v−i(1|x), so suppose that buyer i wins at decision node x under
equilibrium bidding strategies. By the induction hypothesis, the price at decision node x + ei
equals pi(x+ ei) as buyer i does not demand the entire supply at x+ ei. However, by Lemma 4.14
pi(x+ei) ≥ pi(x). On the other hand, as buyer i wins at decision node x under equilibrium bidding
strategies, by Theorem 5.2 pi(x+ ei) ≤ pi(x). Therefore pi(x+ ei) = pi(x). So buyer i must have
won at price no less than pi(x). As buyer i bid pi(x) at x, we conclude that buyer i pays price pi(x)
at x. By Lemma and as buyer i has duopsony power, bi(x) = pi(x) < vi(1|x), and by assumption
b−i(x) < v−i(1|x). In particular, either buyer is indifferent to winning and losing at price pi(x).
This implies that buyer −i’s deviation to v−i(1|x) to win the item at x does not change the price
and utilities at decision node x.
Informally, suppose only buyer 1 has duopsony power; then buyer 1 is constrained by the
equilibrium bidding strategies to make her greedy utility at every possible future node. Thus her
bids equal to her threshold price at every round of the auction. Buyer 2 will then take advantage
of buyer 1’s bidding strategies by purchasing an item whenever possible.
But what happens in the more complex setting where both buyers have duopsony power? Call
buyer i a quasi-monopsonist at decision node x if there exists a realised equilibrium path from x
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to a final round y such that bi(y) ≥ b−i(y). Note that it is possible for both agents to be quasi-
monopsonists at a node x if there is a randomized tie-breaking rule. By decreasing prices, a quasi-
monopsonist may have a realised payoff weakly less than its greedy utility; moreover, a monopsonist
is always a quasi-monopsonist. This definition, along with properties of greedy bidding, allows us
to fully characterise equilibria.
Theorem 5.4. For equilibrium bidding strategies, while no buyer demands the entire supply, prices
at each node are no less than the minimum threshold price. Moreover, at every decision node x
there exists a quasi-monopsonist buyer i. Finally, if buyer i is a quasi-monopsonist at decision
node x and if x+ e−i − ei is also a decision node, then i is again a quasi-monopsonist at decision
node x+ e−i − ei.
Proof. Begin by showing the first statement of the theorem: let x be a decision node. If there
exists a monopsonist buyer i at decision node x, then prices at each node equal pi as long as buyer
i does not demand the entire supply, so suppose that both buyers have duopsony power. Consider
a realised equilibrium path from decision node x; on this path, there must be an earliest decision
node x′ such that some buyer i is a monopsonist. As x′ is the earliest such node, by Lemma 4.1
the previous node on the equilibrium path must be y, where x′ = y + e−i.
Now, bi(y) ≥ pi(y), as: (1) buyer i attains her greedy utility from decision node x
′, and must
earn at least her greedy utility in expectation from decision node y + ei, and (2) by Lemma 5
buyer i’s no-overbidding constraint would not bind if she were to bid pi(y). Furthermore, as buyer
−i wins at decision node y, price at y equals bi(y). However, tracing back to decision node x,
by Lemma 4.14 and Lemma 4.153, pi is decreasing, while prices are non-decreasing. Therefore, at
decision node x, the price is no less than pi(x), hence is no less than the minimum threshold price.
The existence of a quasi-monopsonist is obvious, so we prove the “shift property”. Suppose
that buyer i is a quasi-monopsonist at decision node x, and let P be a realisation of the equilibrium
path such that buyer i’s bid at the final round is no less than buyer −i’s bid at the final round.
Now, take an arbitrary realisation of the equilibrium path Q from x+ e−i − ei. If Q intersects P ,
then the path starting from x + e−i − ei and following Q until intersecting P , and then following
P is an equilibrium path. Therefore, i is a quasi-monopsonist at x+ e−i − ei.
Suppose instead that Q never intersects P . Then if x′,x′′ are respectively nodes on P and
Q with t(x′) = t(x′′) = s, it must be that x′′ = k(s) · (e−i − ei) + x
′ for some k(s) > 0 – as
k(s)− k(s+1) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and as the initial nodes have difference k(t) = 1. In particular, if y is a
node on P with t(y) = 1, then y + k(1) · (e−i − ei) is a node on Q. Then at the last round of the
auction on Q, buyer i bids vi(1 − k(1)|y) ≥ vi(1|y) and buyer −i bids v−i(1 + k(1)|y) ≤ v−i(1|y).
By choice of P , vi(1|y) ≥ v−i(1|y). Therefore, buyer i weakly outbids buyer −i at the final round
of the auction on realised equilibrium path Q, hence buyer i is a quasi-monopsonist at decision
node x+ e−i − ei.
It may not be immediately apparent, but Theorem 5.4 gives us a very clear picture of what
happens at an equilibrium. Specifically, each equilibrium consists of three phases. The first phase
is the competitive phase. In this phase the identity of the “eventual monopsonist” may change
depending on the winner of an item (and may be uncertain due to randomized tie-breaking).
Consequently, the two buyers compete to buy items and drive prices above the threshold prices.
The buyer who fails to win enough items in this phase retains sufficient duopsony power to become
3Buyer i cannot demand the entire bundle at any node from y to x, as she is not a monopsonist.
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a monopsonist. The second phase, the competition reduction phase, begins once the identity of the
monopsonist is established. The monopsonist then posts its threshold price in each round. The
other buyer exploits the monopsonist’s bidding strategy to purchase items. This phase ends when
the competition from the other buyer has been weakened sufficiently enough for the monopsonist
to desire winning all the remaining items. Thus we enter the third phase, the monopsony phase,
where the monopsonist purchases all the remaining items at its current baseline price.
6 The Price of Anarchy
The price of anarchy of a sequential auction is the worst-case ratio between the social welfare
attained at an equilibrium allocation and the welfare of the optimal allocation. In this section, we
show first show the flaw with the previously claimed proof of the price of anarchy for two-buyer
sequential auctions with overbidding allowed. This motivates us to inspect the price of anarchy
under the no-overbidding constraint. We then exploit our equilibrium characterization to prove
that the price of anarchy is exactly 1− 1/e in two-buyer sequential auctions with no-overbidding,
assuming weakly decreasing incremental valuations.
6.1 On the Price of Anarchy of Equilibria with Overbidding
For two-buyer sequential auctions with overbidding permitted, an identical guarantee of 1− 1/e on
the price of anarchy was claimed by Bae et al. [3, 4]. The proof in the original paper [3] was flawed
and a new proof was given in [4]. Unfortunately, as we now explain there is also a flaw in the new
proof.
Interestingly, Example 4 also illustrates the bug in [4]. Observe, from Figure 3, that the
efficiency of this auction is:
1 + (2/3 − 2ǫ/3) + (1/2 + ǫ)
3
=
13
18
+
ǫ
9
This gives a corresponding price of anarchy of 13/18 = 0.722. Of course, this in itself is not
problematic as it exceeds 1 − 1/e = 0.632. To explain the problem requires the following notion
defined in [4], which we present in the terminology of this paper. Assume that the valuations are
non-decreasing and concave, and they satisfy v1(k) = 1 for any k ∈ [T ] and v2(1) ≤ v1(T ), then we
say that the marginal utilities satisfy the subgame kink property if:
1. On the equilibrium path, buyer 1 wins all his items last.
2. At any node off the equilibrium path, buyer 1 wins.
Notice that our auction in Figure 3 satisfies the subgame kink property. Furthermore, in Lemma 5
of [4], it is suggested that:
Lemma. [4] For any T ∈ N, if v1(k) = 1 for any k ∈ [T ] and b ≤ 1, amongst valuation profiles
that support equilibria satisfying the subgame kink property, the minimal efficiency valuation profile
for buyer 2 with the constraint v2(1) ≤ b is given by, for some k ∈ [T ]:
v2(j) =
{
1− kT−j+1 j ∈ [T − k]
0 otherwise
(24)
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In particular, for the auction of Example 4, we have v2(1) ≤ 2/3− δ for small δ > 0. Consider
applying the lemma above for b = 2/3 − δ. Then the minimal efficiency v2(·) should be given by
(24) for some k ∈ [T ]. It can’t be that k = 1, as that would imply v2(1) = 2/3 > 2/3 − δ. On the
other hand, k = 3 leads to efficiency. So, in this case, the minimal efficiency should be given by
k = 2 where:
v2(j) =
{
1/3 j = 1
0 j ∈ {2, 3}
Let us compute the resultant equilibrium bidding strategies. In the final round of the auction, it
is always the case that buyer 1 wins the item and pays buyer 2’s incremental value. So for t = 1,
u1(x) = 2/3 if x = (2, 0) and u1(x) = 1 otherwise. Also for such x, u2(x) = 0. Buyer 1 then bids
b1(e1) = 1 + 2/3 − 1 = 2/3 at decision node (1, 0) and bids 1 at node (0, 1). On the other hand,
because u2(x) = 0 for any x with t = 1, we have u2(e1) = 1/3 and u2(e2) = 0. So at decision node
(1, 0), buyer 1 wins an item at price 1/3, and at decision node (0, 1), it wins an item at price 0.
Therefore, u1(e1) = 4/3, u1(e2) = 2 and u2(e1) = u2(e2) = 0. Consequently, the bids at decision
node 0 are:
b1(0) = 1 + 4/3 − 2 = 1/3
b2(0) = 1/3 + 0− 0 = 1/3
Breaking the tie in favour of buyer 2, this valuation profile has price of anarchy:
1/3 + 1 + 1
3
=
7
9
=
14
18
But this is greater than 13/18 + ǫ/9 for sufficiently small ǫ > 0, hence it is not minimal. The
problem seems to be in the induction step. The proofs assume in a minimal efficiency auction with
v2(1) ≤ b that if buyer 2 wins the first item, then the subauction starting from (0, 1) is also a
minimal efficiency auction with v2(2) ≤ v2(1). Our example shows that this is not necessarily the
case: the subauction starting from (0, 1) need not be minimal, as there are further constraints on
it if buyer 2 is to win at (0, 0).
While the arguments in [4] may be incorrect, we strongly suspect that the claimed efficiency
result is correct. Reducing the minimal efficiency problem to a mixed-integer linear program,
we were able to verify for T ≤ 12 that T -round minimal efficiency auctions with concave and
non-decreasing valuations, where v1(T ) ≥ v2(1) and buyer 1 is constrained to win k items in the
equilibrium, do have buyer 2’s incremental valuations satisfy equation (24) (with the same k). This
implies the 1− 1/e efficiency bound holds for T ≤ 12.
6.2 Social Welfare in Two-Buyer Sequential Auctions with No-Overbidding.
Let’s begin with the required definitions. The social welfare of the allocation where buyer 1 wins
k ∈ [t] ∪ {0} items from decision node x is sw(k|x) =
∑k
i=1 v1(i|x) +
∑t−k
i=1 v2(i|x). The optimal
social welfare is opt(x) = maxk∈[t]∪{0} sw(k|x) and the corresponding set of optimal allocations
from decision node x is argopt(x) = argmaxk∈[t]∪{0} sw(k|x).
The duopsony factor (6) of each buyer provides an explicit form of the set of optimal allocations.
Specifically, the set of optimal allocations at decision node x forms an interval.
Claim 6.1. The set of optimal allocations is argopt(x) = [f1(x), t− f2(x)] ∩ Z at x.
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Proof. To begin observe that, for 0 ≤ k < t, we have
sw(k + 1|x) − sw(k|x) = v1(k + 1|x)− v2(t− k|x) (25)
First, assume that k < f1(x) and so k+1 ≤ f1(x). By definition of duopsony factor (6) of buyer 1,
it follows that v1(k + 1|x) − v2(t − k|x) > 0. So, by (25), we have sw(k + 1|x) > sw(k|x). The
lower bound on the claimed interval then holds.
Second, assume f1(x) ≤ k < t−f2(x). Because k+1 > f1(x), we have v1(k+1|x) ≤ v2(t−k|x),
by definition of duopsony factor (6) of buyer 1. Furthermore, as as k < t− f2(x) we have t− k >
f2(x). Therefore, v2(t− k|x) ≤ v1(k + 1|x), by definition of duopsony factor (6) of buyer 2. Ergo,
v2(t − k|x) = v1(k + 1|x). Thus sw(k + 1|x) = sw(k|x) and each integer in the interval has the
same social welfare.
Finally, assume k ≥ t−f2(x). Then t−k ≤ f2(x). Hence v2(t−k|x) > v1(k+1|x) by definition
of duopsony factor (6) of buyer 2. It follows that sw(k + 1|x) < sw(k|x). The upper bound of the
claimed interval then holds.
Now, recall each equilibrium induces an equilibrium path in the extensive form game. Thus,
we must study the social welfare arising along paths. Formally, a path from decision node x is a
(t+1)-tuple P = (xt,xt−1, ...,x1,x0), such that (i) The first node on the path is x, that is, xt = x,
and (ii) Each successive node follows from some buyer j acquiring an item, that is, for each s ∈ [t]
we have xs−1 = xs+ej, for some buyer j ∈ {1, 2}. We say that a path is an equilibrium path (taken
with positive probability) if each successive node is the result of a buyer j winning with positive
probability, that is xs + ej implies that πj(b|x) > 0. Finally, for any path P = (x
t,xt−1, ...,x1,x0)
and any s ∈ [t], we say that P s = (xs, ...,x0) is the subpath of P of length s+ 1.
We may then define a measure of efficiency along a path P = (xt,xt−1, ...,x1,x0). The efficiency
along a path P from x is:
Γ(P ) =
sw(x01 − x
t
1|x)
opt(x)
We will see that if neither buyer has monopsony power then the efficiency of a path can be bounded
by the efficiency along a subpath.
We now present a conditional lower bound on efficiency:
Lemma 6.2. Let P be a path from x where t > 1. If neither buyer has monopsony power , that is
fi(x) < t for each buyer i, then Γ(P ) ≥ Γ(P
t−1).
Proof. Without loss of generality, let x11 − x
0
1 = e1. So buyer 1 is allocated the item at decision
node x along the path P . Observe that:
argopt(x+ e1) = [f1(x+ e1), t− 1− f2(x+ e1)]
= [f1(x+ e1), t− 1− f2(x)]
Here the first equality follows from Claim 6.1 and the second equality follows from Claim 4.4. In
particular, t − 1 − f2(x) is in the interval argopt(x + e1). But, again by Claim 6.1, t − f2(x) is
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in the interval argopt(x). Hence:
opt(x) =
t−f2(x)∑
i=1
v1(i|x) +
f2(x,t)∑
i=1
v2(i|x)
= v1(1|x) +
t−f2(x)∑
i=2
v1(i|x) +
f2(x,t)∑
i=1
v2(i|x)
= v1(1|x) +
t−1−f2(x)∑
i=1
v1(i|x+ e1) +
f2(x,t)∑
i=1
v2(i|x+ e1)
= v1(1|x) + opt(x+ e1) (26)
Where the third equality follows from a change of variables in the first summation, and by consid-
ering the shifted valuations for x→ x+ e1. We may then bound the efficiency along P :
Γ(P ) =
sw(x01 − x
t
1|x)
opt(x)
=
∑x0
1
−xt
1
i=1 v1(i|x) +
∑x0
2
−xt
2
i=1 v2(i|x)
opt(x)
=
∑x0
1
−xt
1
i=2 v1(i|x) +
∑x0
2
−xt
2
i=1 v2(i|x) + v1(1|x)
opt(x)
=
∑x0
1
−xt−1
1
i=1 v1(i|x+ e1) +
∑x0
2
−xt−1
2
i=1 v2(i|x+ e1) + v1(1|x)
opt(x)
=
sw(x01 − x
t−1
1 |x+ e1) + v1(1|x)
opt(x+ e1) + v1(1|x)
≥
sw(x01 − x
t−1
1 |x+ e1)
opt(x+ e1)
= Γ(P t−1)
Where the fourth equality follows since xt−11 = x
t
1 + 1 and x
t−1
2 = x
t
2. The fifth equality holds
by (26). The inequality arises because v1(1|x) ≥ 0.
We may now provide a proof that a path P that does not attain full efficiency has a subpath
P ′ whose initial node has a strict monopsonist, such that Γ(P ) ≥ Γ(P ′).
Lemma 6.3. Let P be a path from x. If fj(x
s) < t for each buyer j ∈ {1, 2} and for all s ∈ [t]
then Γ(P ) = 1. Otherwise, if fj(x
s) = s for some buyer j and some s ∈ [t] then Γ(P ) ≥ Γ(P t¯),
where t¯ = max{s ∈ [t] : ∃j ∈ {1, 2}, fj(x
s) = s}.
Proof. First, suppose fj(x
s) < s for each buyer j ∈ {1, 2} and for all s ∈ [t]. Then, by Lemma 6.2,
Γ(P s) ≥ Γ(P s−1) for any 2 ≤ s ∈ t. Therefore, Γ(P ) ≥ Γ(P 1). But, at x1, we have a single-item
second price auction, which is fully efficient. That is, Γ(P 1) = 1. Thus Γ(P ) = 1.
Second, suppose fj(x
s) = s for some buyer j and some s ∈ [t]. By Claim 4.3, the set {s ∈ [t] :
∃j ∈ {1, 2}, fj(x
s) = s} is equal to [t¯]. In particular, for any buyer j and any s ∈ [t] \ [t¯] we have
fj(x
s) < s. Therefore, by repeated application of Lemma 6.2, it follows that Γ(P ) ≥ Γ(P t¯).
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Corollary 6.4. Let P be an equilibrium path from x. If P does not have full efficiency, then for
some s ∈ [t], Γ(P ) is bounded below by Γ(P s), where for some buyer j, fj(x
s) = s.
So, to bound the efficiency of along an equilibrium path, we may restrict attention to equilibrium
paths from a node x where, without loss of generality, buyer 1 has monopsony power.
6.2.1 The Real Extension of the Incremental Valuation Function.
So it suffices to evaluate the efficiency of a sequential auction where buyer 1 is a strict monopsonist
at decision node 0 for some fixed T . By Theorem 5.3, the quantity of items that buyer 1 wins at
equilibrium is at least its greedy demand κ1 := κ1(0). Observe that, for any k > κ1, the welfare
V1(k) + V2(T − k) is greater than V1(κ1) + V2(T − κ1). So we need to only lower bound the social
welfare of the allocation (κ1, T − κ1).
To do so, first consider extending incremental valuations to the real line, where ∀τ ∈ [0, t]:
v¯1(τ |x) = v1(⌈τ⌉ |x)
v¯2(τ |x) = v2(⌊τ + 1⌋ |x) (27)
Also note that buyers’ valuation functions also enjoy a real extension:
∀ℓ ∈ R, V¯i(ℓ|x) =
∫ ℓ
0
v¯i(τ |x) dτ
Now, buyer 1 obtains her greedy utility, µ1(0). We already know that this implies that this
is the maximum of its greedy strategies for purchasing any integral amount. However, with the
real extension, buyer 1’s greedy utility must also maximise her payoff amongst greedy strategies
purchasing a fractional amount of items.
Lemma 6.5. Suppose that buyer 1 is a strict monopsonist at decision node x. Then for any
k ∈ [0, t]:
µ1(x) ≥ V¯1(k|x) − k · v¯2(t− k|x)
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. there exists k ∈ (0, t) such that:
µ1(x) < V¯1(k|x) − k · v¯2(t− k|x) (28)
Note that, as buyer 1 is a strict monopsonist, for any ℓ ∈ [0, t]:
v¯1(ℓ|x) = v1(⌈ℓ⌉|x) > v2(t− ⌈ℓ⌉+ 1|x) = v¯2(t− ℓ|x)
Therefore:
0 ≤
∫ ⌈k⌉
k
v¯1(ℓ|x) dℓ − (⌈k⌉ − k)v2(t− ⌈k⌉+ 1|x) (29)
Adding together Equation 28 and Equation 29:
µ1(x) < V1(⌈k⌉) − ⌈k⌉v2(t− ⌈k⌉+ 1|x) = µ¯1(⌈k⌉|x)
Contradiction to the definition of µ1(x).
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By definition of µ1, as incremental valuations are non-negative, this yields an immediate bound
of v¯2:
Corollary 6.6. Suppose that buyer 1 is a strict monopsonist at decision node x. Then for any
k ∈ [0, t]:
v¯2(ℓ|x) ≥
1
t− ℓ
∫ t−ℓ
κ1(x)
v¯1(τ |x) dτ
6.2.2 The Price of Anarchy in Two-Buyer Sequential Auctions with No-Overbidding.
Corollary 6.6 implies that if a strict monopsonist buyer 1 demands a small number of items, buyer
2’s incremental valuations cannot also be small. Also, by our equilibrium characterisation we know
that buyer 1 also purchases at least κ1(0) items. Using these facts, we are able to prove an upper
bound on the price of anarchy.
Theorem 6.7. A two-buyer sequential multiunit auction with concave and non-decreasing valua-
tions has price of anarchy at least (1− 1/e), given no-overbidding.
Proof. Take a realised equilibrium path: by Corollary 6.4, restrict attention to the case when
buyer 1 is a strict monopsonist and when the equilibrium path starts from decision node 0 for some
T > 0. Then social welfare is decreasing in the final allocation of buyer 1. By Theorem 5.3, buyer 1
wins at least κ1(0) items. Denoting κ1(0) := κ for simplicity, the following is then a lower bound
on the social welfare: ∫ κ
0
v¯1(τ) dτ +
∫ T−κ
0
v¯2(τ) dτ
Then by Corollary 6.6, we have a lower bound on social welfare:∫ κ
0
v¯1(τ) dτ +
∫ T−κ
0
1
T − τ
∫ T−τ
κ
v¯1(λ) dλ dτ =
∫ κ
0
v¯1(τ) dτ +
∫ T
κ
∫ T−λ
0
1
T − τ
v¯1(λ) dτ dλ
=
∫ κ
0
v¯1(τ) dτ +
∫ T
κ
ln
(T
λ
)
v¯1(λ) dλ
≥ inf
γ∈[0,T ]
∫ γ
0
v¯1(τ) dτ +
∫ T
γ
ln
(T
λ
)
v¯1(λ) dλ
The expression in the infinimum is differentiable almost everywhere, in fact for any non-integral γ.
Then evaluating the first-order condition for γ:
v¯1(γ)
(
1− ln
(
T
γ
))
= 0⇒ γ =
T
e
The function is indeed differentiable at γ = T/e, as T/e is irrational (hence is not an integer).
Minimality is ensured by a first derivative test. Plugging back this value to find the minimum:
inf
γ∈[0,T ]
∫ γ
0
v¯1(τ) dτ +
∫ T
γ
ln
(T
λ
)
v¯1(λ) dλ = V¯1
(T
e
)
+
∫ T
T/e
ln
(T
λ
)
v¯1(λ) dλ
= V¯1
(T
e
)
+ ln
(T
λ
)
V¯1(λ)
∣∣∣T
T/e
+
∫ T
T/e
V¯1(λ)
λ
dλ
=
∫ T
T/e
V¯1(λ)
λ
dλ ≥
V¯1(T )
T
·
(
T −
T
e
)
= V1(T ) ·
(
1−
1
e
)
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Here, the second equality follows from integration by parts. The inequality then follows since
V¯1(λ) is normalised at zero and concave, which implies that V¯1(λ)/λ is decreasing in λ. As V1(T )
is the optimal social welfare, we conclude that resultant social welfare must be at least (1 − 1/e)
times that of an optimal allocation.
To conclude our discussion, we provide a matching lower bound on the price of anarchy:
Theorem 6.8. There exist two-buyer sequential multiunit auctions with concave and non-decreasing
valuations and T items, whose efficiency tends to (1− 1/e) as T grows, given no-overbidding.
Proof. To see that the limit is tight as T →∞, consider the following valuation profile ∀i ∈ [T ]:
v1(i) = 1
v2(i) = max
{
⌊T (1− 1/e)⌋ − i+ 1
T − i+ 1
, 0
}
(30)
Then f1(0) = T , µ1(0) = T/e, and κ1(0) ∈ {⌊T/e⌋, ⌈T/e⌉}. Let all ties be broken in favour of
buyer 2. By Theorem 5.3, buyer 2 wins T − κ1(0) items and buyer 1 wins κ1(0) items – as by
Lemma 5 buyer 2’s greedy strategies will be weakly above those of buyer 1’s until buyer 1’s demand
binds. Therefore, an upper bound on the social welfare at equilibrium is:
κ1(0)∑
i=1
v1(i) +
T−κ1(0)∑
i=1
v2(i) ≤
⌈T/e⌉∑
i=1
v1(i|0) +
⌊T (1−1/e)⌋∑
i=1
v2(i|0)
= ⌈T/e⌉ +
⌊T (1−1/e)⌋∑
i=1
1−
T
e
·
1
T − i+ 1
= T −
⌊T (1−1/e)⌋∑
i=1
T
e
·
1
T − i+ 1
Here the first equality follows from (30), and the fact that κ1(0) ≤ ⌈T/e⌉. Because opt(0) = T , it
immediately follows that an upper bound on efficiency is:
1−
1
e
·
⌊T (1−1/e)⌋∑
i=1
1
T − i+ 1
Taking the limit as T →∞, we obtain:
lim
T→∞
1−
1
e
·
⌊T (1−1/e)⌋∑
i=1
1
T − i+ 1
= 1− lim
T→∞
1
e
·
⌊T (1−1/e)⌋∑
i=1
1
T
·
1
1− i/T + 1/T
= 1−
1
e
·
∫ 1−1/e
0
1
1− x
dx
= 1 +
1
e
· ln(1− x)
∣∣∣∣
1−1/e
x=0
= 1−
1
e
Here the second equality follows by interpreting the summation as a Riemann integral.
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